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PRODUCTS LIABILITY - CAN IT KICK THE SMOKING
HABIT?
In 1964, the Surgeon General's Advisory Committee on smoking and
health announced that "cigarette smoking is a health hazard of sufficient im-
portance in the United States to warrant appropriate remedial action."' The
1964 report established that cigarette smoking males had a 70% excess risk of
mortality over nonsmokers;2 that smoking was causally related to lung cancer
in men,3 and was one of the most important causes of chronic bronchitis in
men and women.4 The report, however, did not establish causality between
smoking and either death from coronary heart disease,5 or lung cancer in
women.' The 1964 study was based on approximately 6,000 articles in the
world literature on smoking and health.7
Fifteen years later, a report of the United States Surgeon General,' sup-
ported by over 30,000 articles on smoking and health,9 announced that
"cigarette smoking is the single most important preventable environmental fac-
tor contributing to illness, disability and death in the United States."'" The
report concluded the general mortality rate for smokers of cigarettes to be
about 1.7 as compared to nonsmokers," with the ratio being somewhat less for
women.' The report announced the following: 1) that cigarette smoking was
the major cause of lung cancer; 3 and 2) that smokers, including cigarette, pipe
and cigar smokers,' 4 had a six to thirteen times greater mortality rate from
cancer of the larynx than nonsmokers, 5 and a three to ten times greater mor-
'U.S. DEP-T. OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE. SMOKING AND HEALTH: REPORT OF THE ADVISORY
COMMITTEE To THE SURGEON GENERAL OF THE PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE 33 (1964).
11d. at 31.
31d.
11d.
1d. at 32.
11d. at 31.
11d. at 14.
'U.S. DEP-T. OF HEALTH. EDUCATION AND WELFARE, SMOKING AND HEALTH: REPORT OF THE SURGEON
GENERAL (1979).
lid. at 1-5.
111d. at VII.
111d. at 1-10.
"11d. at I-Il.
"Id. at 1-16.
'This comment is limited to potential litigation arising from cigarette induced cancer. However, the theories
of liability are applicable to other tobacco related items particularly chewing tobacco, popularly known as
snuff. Snuff is popular among high school students and contains no warning label. Consider Sean Marsee, an
18 year old high school athlete who used approximately a can of snuff daily since the age of 12. Sean
developed cancer and died approximately a year after diagnosis, admitting that he still craved the snuff.
Fingner, Sean Marsees Smokeless Death, READERS DIGEST 107 (Oct. 1985).
"The report concluded that cigarette smoking was causally related to cancer of the esophagus, urinary blad-
der, kidney and pancreas. Id. at 1-17.
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tality rate from cancer of the oral cavity. 6 Most significantly, the 1979 report
determined that cigarette smoking is one of the risk factors for certain car-
diovascular diseases."
By 1983, the Surgeon General announced 18 that"cigarette smoking should
be considered the most important of the known modifiable risk factors for cor-
onary disease in the United States,"' 9 with cigarette smoking being "the major
cause of coronary heart disease in the United States."20 The 1983 report an-
nounced a two to fourfold greater incidence of coronary heart disease in
smokers than nonsmokers and a 1.7 death rate.2' Alarmingly, the 1983 report
estimated that cigarette smoking was responsible for the premature death, be-
tween 1965 and 1980, of over three million people.2 "Unless the smoking
habits of the American people change, perhaps 10% of all persons now alive
may die prematurely of heart disease attributable to their smoking behavior.
The total number of such premature deaths may exceed twenty-four million"
23
Cigarettes are a manufactured product," processed and distributed by a
United States industry with total estimated revenues in 1984 of twenty-nine
billion dollars" and profits of 3.1 billion dollars.26 In spite of massive scientific
evidence linking causally cigarette smoking to cancer, no manufacturer of
cigarettes or tobacco products has been required to pay damages to a user for
health-related liability. 7 Plaintiffs' attorneys, however, are preparing a new
16Id.
71d. at 4-63. The report indicated that smoking was a risk factor for heart attack manifest as fatal and non-
fatal myocardial infarction. The effect was dose related with a stronger association at younger ages. Smok-
ing was associated with arteriosclerotic aneurysm of the aorta and atherosclerosis, although the association
between smoking and stroke or hypertension was inconclusive. Id. at 4-64.
"U.S. DEP-T. OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES. REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL. THE HEALTH CONSE-
QUENCES OF SMOKING: CARDIOVASCULAR DISEASE (1983).
"Id. at IV.
mid. at 127.
2 Id. at 128.
221d.
231d.
2
'The United States tobacco industry in 1980 was ranked second only to the automobile industry in degree of
concentration. KINNEY. TOBACCO'S GLOBAL ECONOMY: Is NORTH CAROLINA LOSING? THE TOBACCO IN-
DUSTRY IN TRANSITION 204, (W. FINGER ed. 1981). Four major firms, R.J. Reynolds, Philip Morris, Brown
and Williamson and American Brands controlled 88% of the market. Id.
2 5STANDARD & POOR'S INDUSTRY SURVEY: FOOD. BEVERAGE AND TOBACCO. BASIC ANALYSIS, § 2 F.30 (April
I1, 1985).
163 VALUELINE INVESTMENT SURVEY. Ratings and Reports 337 (2d ed. Oct. 4, 1985). (Hereinafter cited as
VALUELINE). Valueline combines alcohol and tobacco companies and reports sales and profits as a group.
For the years 1983 and 1984, two firms dominated the cigarette market. In 1984, Philip Morris earned ap-
proximately 889 million dollars on sales of 10 billion, STANDARD & POOR'S INDUSTRY SURVEY: FOOD.
BEVERAGE AND TOBACCO. BASIC ANALYSIS. § 2, F.52 (April II, 1985), and in 1983 Reynolds (R.J.) Industries
earned approximately 835 million on sales of close to 10 billion. Id. at F.52.
27Tobacco companies have successfully defended themselves in more than 200 cases over the past 30 years
involving the smoking and health issue. STANDARD & POOR'S INDUSTRY SURVEY: FOOD. BEVERAGE AND
TOBACCO. CURRENT ANALYSIS, § 2, F.I (October 10, 1985).
[Vol. 19:2
2
Akron Law Review, Vol. 19 [1986], Iss. 2, Art. 5
https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol19/iss2/5
COMMENTS
assault." Armed with strict liability in tort, and a renewed sense that society is
perhaps ready to hold the tobacco companies accountable,29 a number of at-
torneys have filed suits3" to recover damages from alleged cigarette induced
cancer and heart disease.3
This comment, divided into two major sections, will review the reasons
for past inability to collect damages32 from the tobacco industry and explore
possible theories of recovery that may be advanced in the new round of pend-
ing litigation."
I. THE GREAT DEBATE
The apparent voluntary consumption" of a manufactured product that
kills35 has been one of the great debates in United States history,36 and con-
"Bean, Cigarette and Cancer: Lawyers Gear up to Battle Tobacco Firms, WALL ST. J., April 29, 1985, at 27,
col. 3.
,'The stocks were trading well below their peak levels of the previous twelve months. "The problem - Wall
Street is nervous about pending products liability litigation and this concern has fostered generally weak
price momentum for the stocks of American Brands, Philip Morris, R.J. Reynolds and U.S. Tobacco."
VALUELINE. supra note 26, at 337.
"Currently there are estimated to be 40 suits pending. STANDARD& POOR'S CURRENT ANALYSIS, supra note
27, at F.I. By the end of 1985 three Texas law firms plan to file more than 100 additional suits. Bean, supra
note 28, at col. 5.
"One suit involves the death of a sixty-eight year old man who smoked three packs of Camels a day and
eventually died of lung cancer and emphysema. Bean, supra note 28, at col. 4. In another, the victim, who
died of cancer and emphysema "spent his last days wearing an oxygen mask, which he occasionally removed
so he could sneak drags on a cigarette." Id. at col. 4.
2STANDARD & POORS CURRENT ANALYSIS. supra note 27, at F. I.
3See infra text accompanying notes 38-52. Although this comment is limited to United States jurisdictions
the smoking and health issue is being addressed world wide. FINGER. supra note 24, at 301. At least 35 coun-
tries have taken action primarily by enacting legislation on advertising prohibitions, health warning labels,
restrictions on smoking in public places and public kinds for education, with the intent to prevent youths
and young adults from starting to smoke. Id. at 301, 304-09.
-'There is considerable evidence that smoking may not entirely be voluntary but rather addictive, similar to
other forms of drug abuse. J. HENNINGFIELD. NICOTINE: AN OLD FASHIONED HABIT 83 (1985). The National
Institute on Drug Abuse and the United States Public Health Service have testified that cigarette smoking
was an instance of drug abuse and that patterns of relapse were similar to that of heroin addicts and
alcoholics. Id. at 88. The issue, however, is complex and not entirely resolved. In congressional debates one
senator stated that cigarette smoking was in the same category as "potato chip" consumption. Id. at 86.
Regardless of how medical evidence finally determines the addictive qualities of cigarette smoking, the
answer will impact on issues such as assumption of the risk, failure to warn and generally in the allocation of
fault in comparative negligence jurisdictions. For an analysis of the failure to warn issue with regards to
dependency and the possible defenses, See Garner, Cigarette Dependency and Civil Liability: A Modest Pro-
posal, 53 S. CAL. L. REV. 1423 (1980).
"The American Cancer Society has estimated that in 1982, one hundred and thirty-nine thousand people
died from smoking-related cancer; one hundred and twenty-three thousand from cardiovascular disease
associated with smoking and fifty-two thousand from noncancerous chronic lung disease. N.Y. Times, Sept.
16, 1985, at 3, col. 1.
"Some of the early critics included James 1, who succeeded Queen Elizabeth. James I published a
COUNTERBLASTE TO TOBACCO (1604) and imposed high impost duties on the substance. R. TROYER & G.
MARKLE. CIGARETTES: THE BATrLE OVER SMOKING 31 (1983). l(hereinafter cited as TROYERI). Opposition to
cigarettes in the 1600's was also based on health claims. Tobacco was generally thought to cause sterility, in-
sanity and birth defects. Id. at 32. There were also moral overtones analogous to drunkenness and it was
believed smoking cigarettes induced irresponsibility and was religiously offensive. Id. However, early users
of tobacco advocated its healthful qualities and it was generally regarded as an all-purpose healer. W.
Fall, 19851
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tinues to be an enigma in contemporary health conscious America.37 This com-
ment, however, will not focus on the historical aspects embodied in the exten-
sive literature dealing with the history of tobacco,38 the manufacture of ciga-
rettes, the remarkable growth of its use in the United States,39 or the massive
publicity campaigns conducted by the major United States tobacco
companies.' Nor, will there be an extensive discussion of the scientific studies
regarding the health consequences of cigarette smoking."' If any summary can
be made or conclusions drawn from such a complex and extensively treated
issue as cigarette smoking, then perhaps the evolution of the Cigarette Label-
ing and Advertising Act"2 is appropriate. By Act of July 27, 1965, Congress
declared that it would be unlawful to sell any cigarette without the following
statement. "CAUTION, CIGARETTE SMOKING MAY BE HAZARD-
OUS TO YOUR HEALTH.""3 In 1970, the warning was changed to read:
"WARNING: THE SURGEON GENERAL HAS DETERMINED THAT
CIGARETTE SMOKING IS DANGEROUS TO YOUR HEALTH."" Effec-
tive October 12, 1985, it will be unlawful for anyone to sell a cigarette or to
advertise its sale (except outdoor billboards) without one of the following
labels: SURGEON GENERAL'S WARNING: SMOKING CAUSES LUNG
CANCER, HEART DISEASE, EMPHYSEMA, AND MAY COM-
PLICATE PREGNANCY. 5 Cigarettes were banned on radio and television
SHAKESPEARE, WORK FOR CHIMNEY SWEEPSOR A WARNING FOR TOBACCONISTS VI (1601). Tobacco was also
thought to confer immunity against the Great Plague of 1665 and make a clear voice and a sweet breath. E.
WHELAN. A SMOKING GUN: HOW THE TOBACCO INDUSTRY GETS AWAY WITH MURDER 34 (1984).
[hereinafter cited as WHELANI.
"Although there have been no actual deaths reported, great concern is expressed about dioxin, EDB in grain
pellets, formaldehyde, acid rain and various food additives. WHELAN, supra note 36, at I. Thousands die
each year from smoking related diseases yet only mild protest exists. Id. Five reasons have been suggested:
I) The cigarette culture was established long before the harmful effects were known.
2) Cigarettes are physically addicting and psychologically habit forming.
3) Long-term effects are easy to rationalize.
4) The tobacco industry through advertising has reassured smokers that it is safe.
5) Tobacco Industry has tremendous political clout. Id. at 1-2.
-See generally, WHELAN, supra note 36, at 28; J. HENNINGFIELD, NICOTINE: AN OLD FASHIONED HABIT
(1985). TROYER, supra note 36, at 31, K. FREIDMAN, PUBLIC POLICY AND THE SMOKING-HEALTH CONTRO-
VERSY I (1975); A. FRITSCHLER, SMOKING AND POLITICS: POLICYMAKING AND THE FEDERAL BUREAUCRACY
(2d ed. 1975). Wegman, Cigarettes and Health: A Legal Analysis, 51 CORNELL L.Q. 678 (1965-66).
"The modern cigarette industry is credited with being born on April 30, 1894, when the new Bonsack
cigarette-rolling machine operated successfully for a full working day, WHELAN, supra note 36, at 41.
However, per capita use of tobacco has slipped. In 1979, the average American smoked, chewed or sniffed
less tobacco than in any year since 1898. W. FINGER. supra note 24, at 119.
'Estimated annual expenditures in 1981 were three hundred and four million dollars. WHELAN. supra note
36, at 180. The great 20th century cigarette advertising campaign allegedly began after World War I. Id. at
57.
"See generally, U.S. DEPTr. OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE, supra note 8 and U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH
AND HUMAN SERVICES, supra note 18. See generally, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, PUBLIC
HEALTH SERVICES, OFFICE OF SMOKING AND HEALTH: BIBLIOGRAPHY ON SMOKING AND HEALTH (1984).
'215 U.S.C. § 1331 (Supp. 11 1984).
"Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-92, § 4, 79 Stat. 282 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1333 (1982)).
"Act of 1970, Pub. L. 91-222, § 4, 84 Stat. 87 (codified as amended at IS U.S.C. § 1333(a)(l)(1982)).
-15 U.S.C. § 1333 (1982), amended by 15 U.S.C. § 1333(a)(1) (Supp. 11 1984). Cigarette manufacturers and
advertisers by the act are required to rotate the warning quarterly. Included in the rotation are the following:
[Vol. 19:2
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commercials as of January 1, 1974.16
Clearly, the debate that began almost four hundred years ago must be
decided on the basis of overwhelming scientific evidence. The most recent
scientific data on smoking and health documents the costs of smoking in 1980,
in the United States, in terms of health-related effects, to be estimated at forty-
seven billion dollars. 7 In 1985, it was estimated that smoking-related diseases
would result in productivity losses to the economy of twenty-seven to sixty-one
billion dollars and health care costs would approach 48 twelve to thirty-five
billion dollars.
Obviously, smoking produces injury, with such injury resulting in
economic loss and damages. The litigatable issue in the pending cigarette cases
is, who will pay? For, in spite of the vast amount of evidence, health research-
ers are not entirely convinced, 9 nor is it likely that the tobacco industry will
capitulate on the issue of causality. The debate, then, fully documented, is
threatening to return to the courts. There, plaintiffs' attorneys, supported by
thousands of studies indicating a causal relationship between smoking and
cancer and propounding novel theories of recovery, will seek to reverse what
has been total victory for the cigarette industry to date.
A. Prior Litigation
1. Green v. American Tobacco Company.
Green v. American Tobacco Co.50 is a landmark case involving cigarette
manufacturer liability, not only in terms of its substantive law, but also its pro-
cedural history and the intensity with which it was obviously litigated. In
Green, Edwin Green, Sr. brought suit against the American Tobacco Com-
pany in December 1957, alleging that he had acquired lung cancer as a result
SURGEON GENERALS WARNING: QUITTING SMOKING NOW GREATLY REDUCES SERI-
OUS RISKS TO YOUR HEALTH; SURGEON GENERAL'S WARNING: SMOKING BY PREG-
NANT WOMEN MAY RESULT IN FETAL INJURY, PREMATURE BIRTH, AND LOW BIRTH
WEIGHT; SURGEON GENERAL'S WARNING: CIGARETTE SMOKING CONTAINS CARBON
MONOXIDE.
"15 U.S.C. § 1335 (1982), amendedby 15 U.S.C. § 1335 (1982), amendedby 15 U.S.C. § 1335a (Supp. !1
1984). The ban in 1971 involved cigarettes and little cigars. The 1984 amendment requires that all manufac-
turers provide to the secretary a list of the ingredients added to tobacco in the manufacture of cigarettes. The
companies required to submit the data will not be identified and the information will be treated as trade
secret or confidential information.
"WHELAN, supra note 36, at 147. Based on data from Luce and Schweitzer in the NEW ENGLAND JOURNAL
OF MEDICINE, March 9, 1978 and assumptions of fifty-four million adult smokers and six hundred and
twelve billion cigarettes sold per year.
"N.Y. Times, Sept. 16, 1985, at 3, col. 1.
"A member of the advisory committee responsible for the "blue-ribbon" Surgeon General's Advisory Com-
mittee on Smoking and Health of 1964, Mr. Carl Seltzer contended as late as 1981, that scientific data does
not support the conventional view that cigarette smoking causes coronary heart disease (CHD). Mr. Seltzer
generally believes that faulty assumptions regarding the statistical models have flawed the results and that
further research is required. SELTZER, CIGARETTE SMOKING AND CORONARY HEART DISEASE: A QUES-
TIONABLE CONNECTION, THE TOBACCO INDUSTRY IN TRANSITION (W. Finger ed. 1981).
'Green v. American Tobacco Co., 304 F.2d. 70 (5th Cir. (1962).
Fall, 19851 COMMENTS
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of smoking Lucky Strike cigarettes.5 The suit asserted six theories of liability.12
The district court sustained directed verdicts on all counts except breach of im-
plied warranty and negligence." The case was submitted to a jury upon the
two theories, with a general verdict being rendered for the defendant."'
However, the jury, in answering interrogatories, indicated that although
Green did have lung cancer in his left lung caused by smoking Lucky Strike
cigarettes," the defendant "by the reasonable application of human skill and
foresight could not have known that users of Lucky Strike cigarettes.., would
be endangered by the inhalation of.. . smoke ... of contracting cancer."56
On appeal,57 the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court. The court ap-
plied Florida law holding that a defendant was not an absolute insurer against
consequences of which developed human skill and foresight could not afford
knowledge.58
In a strong dissent, Judge Cameron argued that the theory of implied war-
ranty requires absolute liability for damages caused by a breach. 9 His conten-
tion was that under the warranty theory a defendant is conclusively presumed
to know of any unwholesome condition and is answerable in damages to a pur-
chaser who is made ill as a result60 The lack of knowledge is imputed as a fault
rendering liability.61 Judge Cameron further characterized implied warranty as
an unconditional guarantee to Green that use of Lucky Strikes would not be
harmful by reason of any deleterious substance or ingredient.62
The dissent in this case coupled with the import of the resounding ques-
tion carried considerable weight and lead to the petition for rehearing being
granted to the extent necessary to certify the issue to the Florida Supreme
"Edward Green, Sr. began smoking cigarettes in 1924 or 1925 when he was sixteen years old. He smoked
from one to three packs per day for thirty years until 1956 when he was advised that he had contracted
cancer of the left lung. Edwin Green died as a result of the cancer on February 25, 1958. Id. at 72.
"Breach of implied warranty; breach of express warranty; negligence; misrepresentation; battery; violation
of the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, the Federal Trade Commission Act, and the Florida Food,
Drug and Cosmetic Act. Id. at 71.
531d.
3"d.
"Principle issues were whether Mr. Green's death was caused by a cancer in the lung and whether that
cancer was caused by smoking Lucky Strikes. Eight eminent medical doctors testified for each side and were
in sharp disagreement. The issue was submitted to the jury. Id. at 72.
56d.
"The basis of the appeal was that the trial court erred in holding that the implied warranty of fitness, under
Florida law, does not cover deleterious substances in a product, which were unknown or unforeseeable.
Plaintiff contended that the knowledge of the manufacturer is irrelevant and immaterial to liability under
Florida's theory of implied warranty. Id. at 72-73.
mId. at 77.
"Green v. American Tobacco Co., 304 F.2d. 70, 81 (5th Cir. 1962) (Cameron, J., dissenting).
"Id. at 82.
11Id. at 78.
"Id. at 81.
[Vol. !19:2
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Court.63 On certification," the Florida Supreme Court 3 held that a manufac-
turer's or seller's knowledge, actual or constructive, as to the unwholesome
condition of its products is irrelevant to the liability issue under a theory of im-
plied warranty." Furthermore, the supreme court held that Florida law im-
posed absolute liability on a manufacturer for a breach of implied warranty of
fitness involving death caused by the use of cigarettes. 7
The case returned to the Fifth Circuit," with both sides moving for a judg-
ment on the issue of liability. 9 The Fifth Circuit initially noted that the re-
maining issue entailed the scope of the defendant's implied warranty." In the
court's opinion the implied warranty required a product to be reasonably fit,
wholesome, and have a reasonable fitness for human use or consumption.7'
The defendant argued that there was no evidence that Lucky Strike cigarettes
were not reasonably fit and wholesome." The court, however, noting expert
testimony, 3 held that if a jury believed that expert testimony it could have
reasonably inferred cigarettes were not reasonably fit or wholesome and
therefore defendants were not entitled to a directed verdict. 4 However, since
the issue of reasonableness was not addressed by the original jury, the case was
remanded for a new trial.75 Since the jury had already determined issues of
'id. at 85.
"Green v. American Tobacco Co., 154 So. 2d 169 (Fla. 1963).
"The following question was certified to the Florida Supreme Court:
Does the law of Florida impose on a manufacturer and distributor of cigarettes absolute liability, as
for breach of implied warranty, for death caused by using such cigarettes from 1924 or 1925 until
February I, 1956, the cancer having developed prior to February 1, 1956, and the death occurring
February 25, 1958, when the defendant manufacturer and distributor could not on, or prior to,
February 1, 1956, by the reasonable application of human skill and foresight, have known that users
of such cigarettes would be endangered, by the inhalation of the main stream smoke from such
cigarettes, of contracting cancer of the lung?
Id. at 170-71.
"Id.
Old. at 170-71.
"Green v. American Tobacco Co., 325 F.2d 673 (5th Cir. 1963).
"Plaintiffs moved for a judgment on the issue of liability based on the.Florida certification. Id. at 674. The
defendant argued that under the Florida Supreme Court's rule a product must be reasonably fit, wholesome
and have a reasonable fitness for human use or consumption. The court's opinion pointed out that the ques-
tion, as framed, did not present the issue of whether the cigarettes, which caused the cancer, were unmer-
charitable as a matter of law. Green, 154 So. 2d at 170.
10Green. 325 F.2d. at 675. The court reasoned that, although defendant's knowledge or ability to know was
irrelevant to the liability issue under implied warranty, there must be a breach of that warranty. If cigarettes
are reasonably fit and wholesome, then no breach results. Id.
71Id.
1American contended that its cigarettes were of no greater danger than cigarettes bearing other brand
names. Id. at 676. There was no contention that the cigarettes contained any foreign substance, spoiled, or
contaminated ingredient. Id.
nDr. Ernest L. Wynder, an expert witness, testified that the major factor that causes lung cancer in
American males is smoking, yet conceded that the vast majority of smokers do not get lung cancer. Id. at
676-77. By vast majority Dr. Wynder meant that nine in ten smokers do not develop lung cancer. Id. at 677.
'4d. at 677.
1id. at 678.
COMMENT'SFall, 19851
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causality and reliance, those issues were foreclosed at the second trial.76 Again,
Judge Cameron dissented," arguing that the Florida Supreme Court con-
clusively decided the case.7" He concluded that the issue was never whether
cigarettes were reasonably fit and wholesome to any person besides Green, 9
and further that the parties stipulated that the issue certified to the Florida
Supreme Court would decide the outcome of the litigation. °
The second trial resulted in a jury decision that cigarettes were reasonably
fit for human consumption, which the plaintiff appealed." The Fifth Circuit
noted that the only issue at the second trial was whether cigarettes were rea-
sonably fit and wholesome for human use.82 The court also noted the judgment
date in the second trial of November 27, 1964.83 The Court felt that date was
significant for on May 5, 1965, the Florida Supreme Court in McLeon v. WS.
Merrell Company 4 stated that Green v. American Tobacco Company "applied
a rule of absolute or strict liability to the manufacturer of a commodity who
had placed it in the channels of trade for consumption by the public
generally." 5
The court reasoned that since Florida law required absolute liability, Mr.
Green was entitled to rely on the implied assurances that Lucky Strike ciga-
rettes were wholesome and fit and, therefore, his widow could hold the tobacco
company absolutely liable for the injuries found by a prior jury to have been
sustained by him." The court reversed the second jury, entered judgment for
plaintiff on the issue of liability and remanded the issue of damages to a third
jury.8 7
Judge Simpson vehemently dissented,8 contending that the majority
76d.
"Green, 325 F.2d. at 679 (Cameron, J., dissenting).
7Id. at 680. Judge Cameron characterized the Florida Supreme Court's answer as follows:
Yes, the law of Florida imposes on a manufacturer and distributor of cigarettes absolute liability, as
for breach of implied warranty, for death caused by using such cigarettes from 1924 or 1925.... Not-
withstanding the fact that the defendant manufacturer and distributor could not ... have known that
users of such cigarettes would be endangered . . . of contracting cancer of the lung. Id. at 68 1.
"Id. at 680.
11Id. at 681.
"Green v. American Tobacco Co., 391 F.2d. 97, 101 (5th Cir. 1968).
1d. The Fifth Circuit expressed its opinion that the parties should have attempted to obtain a direct and
positive answer from the Florida Supreme Court as to whether "the law of Florida impose(s) on a manufac-
turer and distributor of cigarettes absolute liability, as for a breach of implied warranty." Id. The plaintiff
may have been remiss for not doing so since the Florida Supreme Court indicated that the standard for
determining the wholesomeness of a product is its actual safety for human consumption. Id.
63Id.
"McLeod v. W.S. Merrell Co., 174 So. 2d. 736 (Fla. 1965).
"Id. at 739.
"Green, 391 F.2d at 106.
87Id.
uGreen v. American Tobacco Co., 391 F.2d 97, 106 (5th Cir. 1968) (Simpson, J., dissenting).
[Vol. 1 9:2
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misconstrued Florida law by the characterization of Green as imposing strict
liability without fault.8 9 Judge Simpson argued that strict liability without fault
only applied to defective products,9 regardless of whether the defect was
potentially discoverable by the manufacturer.9' He then asserted that the court
was not dealing with a flawed, defective or adulterated product, but rather, one
exactly like any other brand.92 Without a defect, there was no liability.93
The third jury never had the opportunity to consider damages. On a peti-
tion for rehearing,9" the Fifth Circuit, sitting en banc, entered the following per
curiam opinion: 9
The Court sitting en banc recedes from and overrules the decision of the
majority of the panel in this case. Both parts I and II of the opinion are
overruled by the Court. We affirm the judgment of the courts for the rea-
sons and upon the principles set forth in Judge Simpson's dissent .... Af-
firmed.96
So concluded the Green litigation.97 The case litigation lasted approx-
imately twelve years. It involved two jury trials, one having a duration of over
ten days. It encompassed scores of expert witnesses, two jury verdicts for the
defense, in spite of a finding of causality, and a judgment not withstanding the
verdict for the plaintiffs, but no damages.98
2. Lartigue v. R.J. Reynolds
Lartigue v. R.J Reynolds Tobacco Co. " involved another jury tried case
"Id. at 110.
9ld. at Ill.
"Id. at 110. "Even under the new strict liability in tort ... theory found in Section 402A of the Restatement
of Torts (Second), comment i provides: Good tobacco is not unreasonably dangerous merely because the ef-
fects of smoking may be harmful; but tobacco containing something like marijuana may be unreasonably
dangerous." Id.
2Id.
"Id. The Justice stated he would affirm the lower Court and write "finis" to this long and troublesome litiga-
tion. Id. at 113.
"Green v. American Tobacco Co., 409 F.2d 1166 (5th Cir. 1969), reh g denied, 397 U.S. 911 (1970).
951d.
"Chief Judge Brown dissented, with Coleman and Godbold, Circuit Judges, joining. Id. at 1168. Justice
Brown characterized Green as "a mystery wrapped in an enigma," particularly for not recertifying to the
Florida Supreme Court the issue of absolute liability. Id at 1169. "No one knows just what the Supreme
Court of Florida wuld say about the wholesomeness of a product that in one out of ten users brings about
the dreaded cancer." Id.
"The United States Supreme Court denied certiorari. 397 U.S. 911 (1970).
"On the cancer cases generally see Note, Torts-Warranty - Relation of Foreseeability of Risk to the Im-
plied Warranty of a Cigarette Manufacturer, 17 VAND. L. REV. 315 (1963-64), Comment, Cigarette
Manufacturers' Warranty: Application of Old Law or New, I I VILL. L. REV. 546 (1965-66); Comment, Can
Cigarettes be Merchantable. Though They Cause Cancer?. 6 ARIZ. L. REV. 82 (1964-65). Siler, Legal Liabili-
ty in Tobacco Products Cases, 53 Ky. L.J. 712 (1964-65).
W317 F.2d. 19 (5th Cir. 1963).
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concerning cigarette manufacturer liability.'0 On a general verdict for defen-
dants, the plaintiff appealed on the basis of improper jury instructions regard-
ing implied warranty and negligence.' The Fifth Circuit interpreted Louisiana
law as imposing strict liability on a manufacturer for a breach of the implied
warranty of merchantability. 02 However, the court required, in a strict liability
case, that the product contain some defect, with the resultant harm being a
foreseeable consequence.' 3 "It is necessary to show that the warranted product
contained an element from which, on the basis of existing human knowledge,
harm might be expected to flow."' 1 Addressing the contention that the defen-
dants were negligent in failing to warn users of the dangerous propensities of
cigarettes, the court reasoned that given the state of medical and scientific
evidence at the time, 05 defendants had no knowledge of the harm, either actual
or constructive, so as to require a warning' °0
3. Pritchard v. Liggett & Meyers Tobacco Co.
In Pritchard, 107 a directed-verdict was granted to the defendants on causes
of action grounded in negligence and breach of warranty.'' The appellate
court, in ordering a new trial, held that jury questions were presented by the
issues of breach of an express'0 or implied warranty of merchantability,'" and
possible negligence in failing to warn"' or use reasonable testing in determining
whether the product caused injury."2 At the second trial, the jury found that,
although smoking Chesterfield cigarettes caused the plaintiffs cancer,"' the
"'OFrank J. Lartigue smoked two packs of cigarettes per day for fifty-five years, until he was operated on for
cancer of the larynx. He died of lung cancer on July 13, 1955. Plaintiffs claim was based on breach of im-
plied warranty and negligence. Defendants pleaded contributory negligence and assumption of the risk, of-
fering evidence that Lartigue's other illnesses aggravated or were suspected causes of cancer. Id. at 22.
"'The alleged improper instructions allowed the judge to find that the cigarettes manufactured by the defen-
dant were usable as such at the time Lartigue's cancer started. Id. at 23.
"Id. at 35.
0I31d.
"1 Id.
"'The court reasoned that the warning must be made either when smoking started or when the cancer
developed. Since medical science was not aware of the health effects of smoking at either time the defen-
dants could not be held liable for negligence. Id. at 40.
10 ld
"'Pritchard v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 295 F.2d 292 (3rd Cir. 1961).
'"Pritchard alleged that smoking Chesterfield cigarettes from 1921 to 1953 caused his cancer of the right
lung. Id. at 294.
"'The warranty relied on appeared in a July 16, 1934 Pittsburgh newspaper in which it was claimed as to
Chesterfields: "A good cigarette can cause no ills and cure no ailments ... but it gives you a lot of pleasure,
peace of mind and comfort." Id. at 296. Later that month it was stated: "there is no purer cigarette made
than Chesterfield." Id.
"I/d. at 297.
"'Id. at 299.
"'Id. at 300.
"'Pritchard v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 350 F.2d. 479, 482 (3d Cir. 1965).
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defendants could not be charged with negligence."' Furthermore, the jury
found that the defendant made no express warranties,"5 with an ultimate find-
ing that absent reliance the plaintiff assumed the risk of injury." 6
On appeal, the Third Circuit reversed and remanded for a new trial"7 on
the basis that reliance was not required where factual affirmations flowed to
the public with the natural tendency of inducing a purchase."' In addition,
since contributory negligence was not a viable defense in a breach of warranty
action,"' assumption of the risk in the sense of contributory negligence was not
available. 20 Apparently, at this point the suit was dropped and no subsequent
decisions deal with its outcome.'
Other actions were brought against cigarette companies involving cancer-
related liability.
4. Hudson v. R.J. Reynolds
In Hudson v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company, "I a suit brought by Mar-
vin Belli,' the court overruled defendants' appeal from a judgment denying
their motion for summary judgment based on the statute of limitations.'2 4
However, a second motion for summary judgment by the defendants was sus-
tained on the grounds that an implied warranty under Louisiana law extends
only to knowable and foreseeable risks.2 ' The decision was affirmed on ap-
peal "'26 and a petition for rehearing en banc was denied.'27
5. Ross v. Philip Morris Co.
In Ross v. Philip Morris Co., 28 the court, basing its decision on the state
1141d.
1151d.
116M.
"
"Id. at 487. The trial court had denied a motion for a new trial. Id.
1id. at 482.
1"d. at 485.
'10Id. The court did recognize that a consumer could misuse a product and suffer non-actionable damage
because of that misuse. Id.
"'Although the prospects of winning appeared promising, the plaintiff dropped the suit. WHELAN. supra
note 36, at 157.
2427 F.2d 541 (5th Cir. 1970).
"'Attorney Belli has recently filed damage suits against two major tobacco companies in behalf of John C.
Galbraith, a former smoker who died of lung cancer and heart disease. The suit was brought on strict liabili-
ty, negligence, failure to warn and fraud. WHELAN, supra note 36, at 157. For a disposition of that case see
infra text accompanying notes 217-28.
"'R.J. Reynolds Tobacco v. Hudson, 314 F.2d 776, 778 (5th Cir. 1963).
"'Hudson. 427 F.2d at 542.
1261d
127Id.
"'328 F.2d 3 (8th Cir. 1964).
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of scientific knowledge existing when the plaintiff began smoking in the
1930's, '2 held that the defendant could not have foreseen smoking was
dangerous to the general public. 3' Without that foreseeability, the court af-
firmed a jury verdict in favor of the defendant.'
6. Cooper v. R.J. Reynolds
In Cooper v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.,' the plaintiff on appeal, the
court overturned a dismissal for an inadequately drafted complaint,' but lost
on a motion for summary judgment granted by the district court"' and af-
firmed on appeal. 33 The grant of summary judgment was premised on
plaintiffs inability to produce the necessary advertisements that allegedly ex-
tolled the healthful and harmless quality of the defendant's cigarettes.'6 The
advertisements were necessary to sustain plaintiffs allegation of reliance.'37
7. Mitchell v. American Tobacco Co.
In Mitchell v. American Tobacco Co.,' the court reversed defendant's
motion to dismiss based on the statute of limitations.'39 However, the suit was
apparently dropped and no reported decision deals with its outcome.'10
8. Padovani v. Bruchhausen
Finally, in Padovani v. Bruchhausen, "'' the plaintiff successfully vacated,
on mandamus, a preclusion order' based on insufficient pretrial statements.'4 3
Again, however, the suit was apparently dropped and no other reported deci-
sion deals with its outcome.
1291d. at 8.
"
11d.
"'Id. at 16. The verdict was based on the fact that defendant's brand of cigarettes were no more defective
than any other brand and conformed to industry standards.
32234 F.2d 170 (ist Cir. 1956).
13Id. at 172.
"Cooper v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 158 F. Supp. 22 (D. Mass. 1957).
"'Cooper v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 256 F.2d 464 (ist Cir. 1958).
"'Cooper, 158 F. Supp. at 24.
7 'd.
al83 F. Supp. 406 (M.D. Pa. 1960).
"'Statute of limitations begin to run when plaintiff is first aware of the cancer. Id. at 411.
"'WHALEN. supra note 36, at 157.
"'293 F.2d 546 (2d Cir. 1961).
"'The trial court's preclusion order was pervasive. It prevented the plaintiff from offering evidence of lay
witnesses except the plaintiff and his wife; expert testimony; evidence of damages except for one hospital
and two doctor bills; and evidence on the issue of liability in either negligence or breach of warranty. Id. at
547.
"'The action was one for negligence and breach of warranty against Liggett & Myers Tobacco Company.
Plaintiff was seeking damages for cancer of the larynx allegedly caused by smoking defendant's cigarettes.
Id.
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B. From The 1960's To The Present Decade
The cases present an interesting array of issues involving negligence, war-
ranty and strict liability which will impact on future litigation in this area.
Those cases illustrate that causality will not present a future obstacle. For
although causality was a complex issue,'" the juries that considered the issue
found cigarettes caused the litigated injury.'
Rather, of greater import in future cases is the warranty issue and the
reasonable safety of the product - arguably a negligence theory.'" For in-
stance, concepts of the foreseeability of harm, reasonably fit and wholesome,
and reasonably safe, embody traditional negligence concepts. The decisions,
therefore, largely depended on policy considerations, reflecting society's values
and the state of medical knowledge at the time the cases were decided. Par-
ticularly, in Lartigue, there was a noticeable blending of negligence and war-
ranty theories.' 7
The cases were, for the most part, decided in the 1960's prior to or shortly
after the American Law Institute adopted strict liability,' 8 and the courts were
obviously grappling with the limits and semantic contours of strict liability.'4 9
Of course, as medical knowledge advances and scientific evidence ac-
cumulates, concepts such as foreseeability, reasonable fitness, wholesomeness,
merchantability and unreasonable dangerousness, change as do theoretical
'"In Green, the first jury found that one of the causes of Edwin Green's death was smoking cigarettes,
Green v. American Tobacco Co., 304 F.2d. 70, 71-72 (5th Cir. 1962). However, the second jury heard expert
testimony to the effect that the cause of cancer was unknown and, therefore, it could not be said that
cigarettes were unreasonably fit and wholesome, Green, 391 F.2d at 104. The second jury was faced,
therefore, with two mutually impossible propositions; 1) that Green's cancer was caused by smoking; and 2)
that no one knows the cause of cancer. Id. The trial judge was presented with the determined fact that
Green died from the use of the product in presiding over the determination of whether such a product was
nevertheless reasonably safe for use by the general public. Id.
"'Green, 304 F.2d at 72; In Lartigue v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 317 F.2d 19 (5th Cir. 1963), the judge
was certain that the jury, in finding for the defendant cigarette company, never got beyond the issue of
causality since the plaintiff did not prove the causal connection between smoking and lung cancer. Lartigue,
317 F.2d at 23. However, interrogatories were not propounded to the jury, which returned a general verdict.
The issue on appeal was whether the harmful effects of cigarettes were foreseeable. Lartigue, 317 F.2d at 35.
In Pritchard, the jury found that cigarette smoking was one of the causes of the plaintiff's cancer. Pritchard
v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 350 F.2d 479, 482 (3d Cir. 1965).
"Apparently the jury foreman in the Green case felt that cigarettes were not safe but was instructed by the
judge to decide if cigarettes were reasonably safe. N.Y. Times, Nov. 30, 1964, at 15, col. 1.
tThe trial judge's instructions, in Lartigue regarding warranty, imposed liability on a manufacturer who did
not exercise reasonable diligence and care in determining whether its products were reasonably safe for in-
tended use. Lartigue, 317 F.2d at 23.
'
4 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965). In Lartigue, it was reported that the American Law In-
stitute had approved a new section based on strict liability, without contract or negligence, for food products
manufactured or processed for human consumption. Lartigue, 317 F.2d at 25. The American Law Institute
adopted Section 402A on May 22, 1964.
"'The court in Lartigue indicated that courts will hold sellers of food products strictly liable to the ultimate
consumer, yet the results have been difficult to rationalize. Lartigue, 317 F.2d at 26. Recovery has been based
on contract, agency, implied fitness, warranty and strict liability. Id. The court in Lartigue adopted a
characterization of strict liability in tort as requiring foreseeability of harm as a consequence of the existence
of a defect. Id. at 36. It also indicated that the standard of safety as to strict liability in tort is the same as the
standard in negligence theory. Id. at 37.
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under-pinnings of substantive negligence and strict liability law. Theories of
warranty, involving merchantability, were fully litigated in the Green case.
However, Green was decided prior to the first Surgeon General's report
implicating cigarette smoking and cardiac disease which theoretically could
dramatically increase the potential number of plaintiffs. To the extent that
merchantability is a game of numbers,"' and a jury question, and since there
has been fifteen years of additional medical evidence expanding the potential
victims of smoking, it is not inconceivable that a case can be made in such a
way so as to demonstrate that the standard has been breached.
Whether a theory of merchantability will ultimately succeed remains to
be seen. Undoubtably, the issue will be raised. However, plaintiff's lawyers
may well rely on a type of product liability theory, or strict liability in tort for
ultimate success.
II. FUTURE LITIGATION AND PRODUCT'S LIABILITY
The judicial development of product liability doctrine has a rich
heritage. 5' As judicially created common law, it is a complex coalescence of
fraud,' negligence, 5' strict liability based on implied warranty" ' and tort.'"
Generally, liability in a product's case is predicated on strict liability and/or
negligence." 6
"'Only four or five percent of all persons coming into contact with a certain dye react to it. Yet, a buyer of a
hat impregnated with that dye is not precluded from recovering from the seller on an implied warranty that
the hat is reasonably fit for its intended use. Zirpola v. Adam Hat Stores, Inc., 122 N.J.L. 21, 4 A.2d 73
(1939). See generally, J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-7 (2d ed. 1980).
"'Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 50 MINN. L. REV. 791 (1966); Wade,
Strict Tort Liability of Manufacturers, 19 Sw L.J. 5 (1965); Wade, Strict Tort Liability for Products: Past,
Present and Future. 13 CAP. U.L. REV. 335 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Past, Present and Future].
"'Misrepresentations as to product safety, although not constituting a contract, constitutes fraud, with the
party making the misrepresentation responsible to the injured party. Langridge v. Levy, 150 Eng. Rep 683
(Ex. 1837), affd. 150 Eng. Rep. 1458 (Ex. 1838). See generally, Past, Present and Future, supra note 15 1.
"Product liability based on negligence theory was developed through a line of cases beginning with Thomas
v. Winchester, 6 N.Y. 397 (1852) and MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, Il1 N.E. 1050
(1916). It is a theory of recovery for personal injury as a result of the defendant having created an
unreasonable risk, which is foreseeably dangerous. See generally, PROSSER & KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS, §
96 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter cited as PROSSER]; Past, Present and Future, supra note 151, at 338.
'Upon determination that a product is not reasonably fit, there was no need to show fault or privity on the
part of the manufacturer. Past, Present and Future, supra note 151, at 341. This doctrine was initially ap-
plied to food products, however, extension to other products was accelerated through Henningson v. Bloom-
field Motors Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d. 69 (1960). See generally, PROSSER, supra note 153, at 690.
"'Once a product is shown to be defective and unreasonably dangerous there was no need to show fault on
the manufacturer. PROSSER, supra note 15 1, at 692. Strict liability on warranty posed a number of problems.
It required some sort of promise or undertaking on the part of the manufacturer and reliance by the plaintiff
upon that promise or warranty. Id. However, there are policy considerations that arguably required a type of
liability extending beyond concepts of promissory or contractual obligations:
i) Costs of defective products can best be borne by enterprises who make and sell the product;
2) Cause of accident prevention can be promoted by adopting strict liability; and
3) Negligence is very difficult to prove. Id. at 692-93.
"Four theories of recovery are available under the complexities of modern product liability law. PROSSER,
supra note 153, at 678. These are:
[Vol. 19:2
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Strict Liability In Tort
In 1963, the California Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice Traynor,
decided Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc. 1I Yuba is generally
acknowledged as the genesis of modern strict liability in tort.'58 The Yuba deci-
sion'59 clearly rejected the concept that a contract, express or implied, was
necessary to recover for personal injuries caused by either a defective prod-
uct or negligence on the part of the defendant."'
The Yuba court indicated that the purpose of strict liability was "to insure
that the costs of injuries resulting from defective products are borne by the
manufacturers which put such products on the market rather than by the in-
jured persons who are powerless to protect themselves." 62 The court held that
a manufacturer is "strictly liable in tort when an article he places on the
market, knowing it is to be used without inspection for defects, proves to have
a defect that causes injury to a human being.""' In Yuba, the requisite liability
was established upon proof by the plaintiff of injury caused while using the
product in the intended manner as a result of an unknown defect in design and
manufacture.'" Accordingly, the alleged negligence or contractual relationship
between the plaintiff and the defendant was held to be irrelevant. 65
The Yuba court did not grapple with the concept of defective.'" In 1965,
however, the American Law Institute focused concern on the definition of
defective when it adopted Section 402A. 67 It was this concern over definition
that led the American Law Institute to characterize defective as "unreasonably
dangerous."'61 This additional requirement of "unreasonably dangerous" was
1) Strict liability in contract for breach of an express or implied warranty;
2) Negligence liability in contract for breach of an express or implied warranty that the product was
designed and constructed in a workmanlike manner;
3) Negligence liability in tort; or
4) Strict liability in tort.
"'Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1962).
'"PROSSER, supra note 153, at 694.
"'Plaintiff was injured while using a Shopsmith combination saw, drill and wood lathe, when a large piece of
wood flew out of the machine and struck him on the forehead inflicting serious injury. Greenman, 5 Cal. 2d
at 59, 377 P2d. at 898, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 698.
t6"[Liiability is not... governed by ... contract warranties but by ... strict liability in tort. Id. at 63, 377
P.2d at 901, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 701.
16 Id.
1621d
"631d. at 62, 377 P.2d at 900, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 700.
'"Id. at 64, 377 P.2d at 901, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 701.
"1 Id.
'The plaintiff in Yuba introduced, through expert witnesses, substantial evidence that his injuries were
caused by defective design and construction. Id. at 60, 377 P.2d at 899, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 699.
1"'RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
1"Id. SPECIAL LIABILITY OF SELLER OF PRODUCT FOR PHYSICAL HARM TO USER OR CONSUMER:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or consum-
er or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or
Fall, 1985] COMMENTS
15
Kepko: Products Liability - Can It Kick the Smoking Habit?
Published by IdeaExchang @UAkron, 1986
AKRON LAW REVIEW
specifically included to preclude liablility against cigarette manufacturers. 6 9
Section 402(A), comment i, seems to expressly exclude cigarette manufacturers
and liquor distillers,'7° and to some extent, the issue of whether cigarettes are
unreasonably dangerous was previously litigated in the Green case.
With the holding in Yuba and the enactment of Section 402A, 7' diverse
forms of strict liability spread rapidly throughout the jurisdictions.'72 There de-
veloped in the common law a split of authority as to whether a product not on-
ly had to be defective, but unreasonably dangerous as well. Several courts rea-
soned that to require a product be defective and unreasonably dangerous
would resurrect the negligence concepts that strict liability was intended to lay
to rest.' To do so, would lead to a practical formulation of strict liability that
was indistinguishable from negligence.7 4 However, the majority opinion gener-
ally requires both elements.' The result is that, under the guise of unreason-
ably dangerous, numerous shades of strict liability have developed so as to ap-
consumer or to his property if:
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial change in the condi-
tion in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not brought the product from or entered into any contractual rela-
tion with the seller.
"
9Dean Prosser, in characterizing the development of defective, unreasonably dangerous, indicated that the
American Law Institute was concerned that some products, particularly whiskey, cigarettes and some type
of drugs may be unreasonably dangerous, yet not defective. Defective was included to protect the manufac-
turers from liability in such cases. Therefore, the product must not only be dangerous, or unreasonably
dangerous but must be defective. 38 ALl Proceedings 87-88 (1961).
'"RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §402A, comment i (1965). Unreasonably dangerous. The rule stated in
this Section applies only where the defective condition of the product makes it unreasonably dangerous to
the user or consumer. Many products cannot possibly be made entirely safe for all consumption, and any
food or drug necessarily involves some risk of harm, if only from over-consumption. Ordinary sugar is a
deadly poison to diabetics, and castor oil found use under Mussolini as an instrument of torture. That is not
what is meant by "unreasonably dangerous" in this Section. The article sold must be dangerous to an extent
beyond that which would be contemplated by the ordinary consumer who purchases it, with the ordinary
knowledge common to the community as to its characteristics. Good whiskey is not unreasonably dangerous
merely because it will make some people drunk, and is especially dangerous to alcoholics; but bad whiskey,
containing a dangerous amount of fusel oil, is unreasonably dangerous. Good tobacco is not unreasonably
dangerous merely because the effects of smoking may be harmful; but tobacco containing something like
marijuana may be unreasonably dangerous. Good butter is not unreasonably dangerous merely because if
such be the case, it deposits cholesterol in the arteries and leads to heart attacks; but bad butter, con-
taminated with poisonous fish oil, is unreasonably dangerous.
"'WHITE & SUMMERS see very little distinction between merchantability and defective condition,
unreasonably dangerous. Apart from the fact that defective, unreasonably dangerous is somewhat narrower
because it does not purport to reach all defective goods, they find both terms nearly synonymous. J. WHITE
AND R. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 335 (2d ed. 1980). To the extent that merchantability is
synonymous to defective, unreasonably dangerous, the same arguments can be applied with the same out-
come expected as in the Green case.
"'Section 402A Liability in Tort swept the country and nearly every state has adopted some version of strict
liability. PROSSER, supra note 153, at 694.
"'Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121, 501 P.2d 1153, 104 Cal. Rprt. 433 (1972).
1Id. at 133, 501 P.2d. at 1162, 104 Cal. Rptr. 442.
"'Most jurisdictions have apparently adopted both the defective and unreasonably dangerous requirements,
although the element of danger may not be unusual. Id.
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proach negligence theory.7 6 In the cigarette cases therefore, in order to prevail,
a plaintiff must generally show that cigarettes are defective and must also over-
come the clear intent of comment i, of section 402(A), Restatement (Second) of
Torts. The American Law Institute proceedings seemingly indicate that com-
ment i was developed because of concern that the Institute had with the limits
of strict liablity." However, those proceedings transpired in the early 1960's
when the uproar over the health effects of cigarette smoking was just begin-
ning.18
The wording of comment i, as well as the discussion among the members
of the Institute, reflected a point of view, perhaps unconsciously, that ciga-
rettes as well as alcohol in moderate quantity were reasonably safe and become
unreasonably dangerous only when used in excess.'79 They arguably did not
contemplate that the prolonged use of cigarettes, even in moderation, posed
significant dangers. Assumably then, comment i applies to excessive use or
misuse of a product, rather than to proper or moderate use which becomes
unreasonably dangerous through prolonged exposure, particularly if the
perceived danger is not within current scientific knowledge or is ameliorated
by industrial advertising."'
In addition to the arguable inapplicability of comment i to damage caused
by cigarettes, some products, not otherwise defective, have been deemed to be
defective because the manufacturer has failed to warn of a danger in using the
product. 8' The issue then becomes not whether the product is defective but
whether the warning is adequate." 2
Assuming that a plaintiff is able to overcome section 402A, comment i, he
still must show that the product is unreasonably dangerous."'
"6For a general discussion of the overlap of strict liability and negligence see generally: Vandall, "Design
Defect" in Products Liability: "'Rethinking Negligence and Strict Liability." 43 OHIO ST. L.J. 61 (1982);
Keeton, Manufacturer s Liability: The Meaning of "Defect" in the Manufacture and Design of Products, 20
SYRACUSE L. REV. 559 (1969); Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Products 44 Miss. L.J. 825
(1973); Diamond, Eliminating the "Defect" in Design Strict Products Liability Theory, 34 HASTINGS L.
529 (1982-83). In addition, proposed Senate Bill 100, a uniform, national products liability proposal incor-
porates reasonable product manufacture language which is clearly a negligence standard. See generally,
Spacone, The Emergency of Strict Liability. A Historical Perspective and other Considerations. Including
Senate 100, 8 J. PROD. LIAB. 1 (1985).
"'See supra text accompanying notes 167-70.
"'WHALEN, supra note 36, at 97.
"'Good whiskey is not unreasonably dangerous merely because it will make some people drunk, RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF TORTs. 402A, comment i (1965).
lwSee supra notes 167-70.
""'Notwithstanding that a product is properly made, a manufacturer has a duty to warn of latent limitations
respecting its use, where such use might be dangerous .... Biller v. Allis Chalmbers Mfg. Co., 34 111 App 2d.
47, 180 N.E.2d. 46 (1962).
"'For material that addresses the issue of when a non-defective product becomes defective because of a
failure to warn see generally 63 AM. JUR. 2d. Product Liability § 329 (1984); Brody, Recovery Against
Tobacco Companies. 21 TRIAL 49 (Nov. 1985); supra text accompanying notes 180-81.
1"See supra text accompanying notes 172-75.
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Negligence, Strict Liability And Comparative Fault
Generally, strict product liability in tort and negligence involve the same
cause of action against different hypothetical defendants. 8" In strict liability
the plaintiff is required to impugn the product.'85 In negligence, it is the con-
duct of the defendant that is the issue.'86 For instance, to recover in strict
liability the plaintiff must show a flaw in the product that is unreasonably
dangerous.'87 He need not, however, show that the defendant was negligent in
either causing the defect, failing to eliminate the defect, or failing to warn.'"
Ironically, however, in strict liability the conduct of the plaintiff is very often
in issue."' If the product is improperly used or the plaintiff is aware of the
defect, the product is no longer unreasonably dangerous and no liability
results.'" Therefore, in defending strict liability cases emphasis is often on the
plaintiff, similar to assumption of the risk or contributory negligence;
theoretically, defenses available in a pure negligence action. What has emerged,
therefore, is an apparent coalescence of strict liability and negligence into com-
parative fault or comparative negligence.1
91
It is not within the scope of the comment to analyze the very complex and
extensive application of comparative fault to strict product liability in tort
among the various jurisdictions.' 92 However, because of the adoption, albeit
'PROSSER, supra note 153, at 695.
"'Id.
'"Id. at 160.
"'Id. at 695.
'uld. at 692.
"'What should a reasonable purchaser contemplate as unreasonably dangerous? PROSSER. supra note 153, at
699.
'wld at 698-99.
"'Comparative negligence is generally an apportionment of damages between the parties who are at fault.
PROSSER. supra note 153, at 470. The plaintiffs respective fault does not bar his recovery but reduces his
damages in proportion to his fault. Id. at 472.
"'in the following cases, the respective courts have held that comparative negligence is not applicable to
product liability based on strict liability in tort: Kinard v. Corts Co., 37 Col. App. 555, 553 P.2d 835 (1976).
Although not adopting comparative fault, the Kinard court added that an analysis of the user's acts is ap-
propriate in the content of the established defenses of misuse of the product or voluntary and unreasonable
use of the product. Id. at 557, 553 P.2d 837. Roy v. Star Chopper Co., 584 F.2d 1124 (Ist Cir. 1978), cert.
denied, 440 U.S. 916 (1979) (applying Rhode Island law); Melia v. Ford Motor Co., 534 F.2d 795 (8th Cir.
1976); George v. Eaton Corp., 114 Mich. App. 580, 319 N.W.2d 366 (1982); Robinson v. Parker-Hannifin
Corp., 4 Ohio Misc. 2d 6, 447 N.E.2d 781 (1982); Blackwell Burner Co. v. Cerda, 644 S.W.2d 512 (Tex.
1982); Wilson v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 52 Or. App. 139,627 P.2d 1280 (1981), appealed, 292 Or. 626,642 P.2d
644 (1982); South v. A.B. Chance Co., 96 Wash. 2d 439, 635 P.2d 728 (1981); Seay v. Chrysler Corp., 93
Wash. 2d 319, 609 P.2d 1382 (1980); Birch v. General Electric Co., 27 Wash. App. 25,614 P.2d 1323 (1980);
Kirkland v. General Motors Corp., 521 P.2d 1353 (Okla. 1974); Codling v. Paglia, 32 N.Y.2d 330, 298
N.E.2d 627, 345 N.Y.S.2d 461 (1973) (applying Nebraska law decided prior to New York's comparative
negligence statute). The following courts have held that comparative negligence is applicable to strict prod-
ucts liability actions: McPhail v. Culebra, 598 F.2d 603 (Ist Cir. 1979); Edwards v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.,
512 F.2d 276 (5th Cir. 1975); Trust Corp. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 506 F. Supp. 1093 (D. Mont. 1981); Jones
v. M.T.D. Products, Inc., 507 F. Supp. 8 (M.D. Pa.), affd, 649 F.2d 859 (3rd Cir. 1980); Sun Valley Airlines,
Inc. v. Avco-Lycoming Corp., 411 F. Supp. 598 (D. Idaho 1976); Christopherson v. Hyster Co., 58 11. App.
3d 791, 374 N.E.2d 858 (1978); Fiske v. MacGregor, 464 A.2d 719 (R.I. 1983); Przeradski v. Rexnord, Inc.
119 Mich. App. 500, 326 N.W.2d 541 (1982); Mulherin v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 628 P.2d 1301 (Utah 1981);
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not uniform, of comparative fault principles, various defenses become
available depending on how a particular jurisdiction conceptually analyzes
traditional negligence theory involving assumption of the risk, contributory
negligence and allocation of fault. The particular jurisdiction where a cigarette
cancer case is filed will, of course, be critical in determining what traditional
defenses will or will not be available.'93 However, what is more critical and
perhaps more important than terminology is the policy considerations underly-
ing comparative fault in strict liability theory.
Generally, the theoretical policy underpinning of strict liability in tort in-
volves a risk-bearing economic theory based on the assumption that a
manufacturer can shift the cost of a defective product to purchasers by charg-
ing a higher price. 9" Comparative negligence, on the other hand, theoretically
strives to apportion fault based on the respective conduct of the plaintiff and
defendant.'95 Each theory, though focusing on different subjects, generally in-
volves apportionment to some degree based on equity principles.'96 If the suit is
brought in strict liability, or in negligence, equity principles suggest that the
damages incurred by the plaintiff should be apportioned according to the
defendant's and plaintiff's respective fault.'97
To the extent that policy arguments involving equity principles character-
ize both negligence and strict liability it becomes necessary to conceptualize
factors that would impact on the issue. First, comparative fault or negligence
requires that the loss be allocated or shifted to the person who created it.'98 In
addition, the following secondary factors have been suggested:'"
1. The product's utility.
Kennedy v. Sawyer, 228 Kan. 439, 618 P.2d 788 (1980); Suter v. San Angelo Foundry & Mason Co., 81 N.J.
150, 406 A.2d 140 (1979); Baccelleri v. Hyster Co., 287 Or. 3,597 P.2d 351 (1979); Daly v. General Motors
Corp., 20 Cal. 3d 725, 575 P.2d 1162, 144 Cal. Rptr. 380 (1978); Thibault v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 118
N.H. 802, 395 A.2d 843 (1978); General Motors Corp. v. Hopkins 548 S.W.2d 344 (Tex. 1977); Butand v.
Suburban Marine & Sporting Goods, Inc., 555 P.2d 42 (Alaska 1976); Dippel v. Sciano, 37 Wix. 2d 443, 155
N.W.2d 55 (1967).
9 ln jurisdictions that have adopted comparative negligence, a number of decisions have held that the adop-
tion of comparative negligence does not vitiate the common law defense of assumption of the risk as an ab-
solute bar to damages. Other decisions have held that the institution of comparative negligence entailed the
complete abrogation of the defense of assumption of the risk. Still others have relegated it to the status of a
damage reduction factor in the apportionment calculation. See generally, Annot., 16 A.L.R. 4th 700 (1982).
"'PROSSER. supra note 153, at 693.
1Id. at 470.
" O'Shea, Alcohol and Tobacco Manufacturers and Sellers Liability in a Post-Alvn Era, 72 ILL. B.J. 510
(1983-84). Judge O'Shea analyzed the Illinois negligence theory after comparative negligence was adopted by
the Illinois Supreme Court in Alvis v. Ribar, 85 111. 2d 1,421 N.E.2d 886 (1981). He concluded that the total
damages incurred by the plaintiff be apportioned on the basis of the relative degree to which the defendant's
negligence (in a negligence action) or the defendant's defective product (in a products liability action) and the
plaintiffs conduct proximately caused them. O'Shea, supra note 196, at 511.
"'0'Shea, supra note 196, at 511.
'"PROSSER. supra note 153, at 469.
"See generally O'Shea, supra note 196, at 512; Vandall, "Design Defect'" in Products Liability: Rethinking
Negligence and Strict Liability, 43 OHIO ST. L.J. 61, 83 (1982).
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2. Cost of making the product safer.
3. Warnings.
4. Availability of insurance.
5. Cost to society in terms of health care and human life.
6. Profit motive and the effect of advertising.
7. Economic effect on the cigarette industry.
8. Alternative design.
In those cases and jurisdictions where policy considerations dominate
over semantic distinctions, the plaintiffs will be more likely to prevail in a ciga-
rette cancer case. For instance, it could be argued that a cigarette smoker is
aware or should be aware that cigarettes cause cancer and, therefore, either as-
sumes the risk or is contributorily negligent. However, given the high cost of
smoking in terms of human life and health, the enormous impact of advertising
and the profits of the industry, it can conceivably be argued that the industry is
partially at fault.2°° Whether a product is defective and unreasonably danger-
ous, will tend to depend not on whether it is flawed or abnormal, but on
whether its risks outweigh its benefits,210 given a causal connection between the
product and the resultant injury. This would imply a similar policy analysis in-
volving many of the same factors illustrated above. The issue, in these policy
arguments, then becomes whether the product causes injury and how the in-
jury or damage should be allocated among various parties given the delineated
factors.2
On a cause of action involving either negligent or strict liability for failure
to warn, it would be necessary to resolve a number of complex issues impact-
ing on the plaintiff's comparative fault or negligence. For example, have the
cigarette manufacturers adequately warned of the dangers of smoking?0 3 If so,
has their advertising neutralized the warnings? 4 Have the cigarette manufac-
"O'Shea, supra note 196, at 512.
201 Id.
2'21d.
""The adequacy of a warning will vary among jurisdictions. For instance, what constitutes an adequate
warning was stated in Spruill v. Boyle-Midway, Inc., 308 F.2d 79, 85 (4th Cir. 1962):
To be of such character the warning must embody two characteristics: First, it must be in such form
that it could reasonably be expected to catch the attention of the reasonably prudent man in the cir-
cumstances of its use; secondly, the content of the warning must be of such a nature as to be com-
prehensible to the average user and to convey a fair indication of the nature and extent of the danger
to the mind of a reasonably prudent person.
In Crane v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 218 Cal App. 855, 860, 32 Cal. Rptr. 754, 757, the sufficiency of the
warning was approved as follows:
the warning should be such that if followed would make the product safe for users. To comply with
this duty the manufacturer or supplier must appropriately label the product, giving due consideration
to the likelihood of accident and the seriousness of consequences from failure to so label it as to warn
of any dangers that are inherent in it and its use or that may arise from the improper handling or use
of the product.
For various interpretations of the adequacy of the warning see generally Annot., A.L.R.3d 239 (1973).
"'it is contended that the warning given by tobacco companies fail to meet any standard as to adequacy.
Brody, Recovery against Tobacco Companies. 21 TRIAL 49 (Nov. 1985). Warnings do not specify how
cigarettes are dangerous, what the consequences of smoking are or the risks of addiction. Id.
[Vol. 19:2
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turers intentionally misrepresented the effects of smoking? Are cigarettes ad-
dictive as to obviate any and all warnings? °0
Whether these issues are analyzed in terms of assumption of the risk,
unreasonable dangerousness or comparative negligence, it may be more mean-
ingful to characterize them as various policy choices and to resolve them in
terms of a risk versus benefit rationale. Moreover, resolution of these issues
does not impose a win or lose situation, since apportionment or comparative
fault will dominate. It is not unlikely that an allocation of damages could result
in an apportioned recovery for plaintiff.
Current Litigation
The issues of assumption of risk and the adequacy of warnings has been
addressed recently in Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc.2°6 The cigarette com-
pany in this case 07 tried to argue that their compliance with federal warning re-
quirementses immunized it from liability as to anyone who has chosen to
smoke cigarettes inspite of the warning.2" The company argued that federal
legislation had created an irrebuttable presumption that the consumer had
assumed the risk of injury. 10 The court rejected this argument, however,
holding that the Cigarette Labeling Act did not preempt state common law of
products liability."' Although none of the substantive issues were resolved, the
court indicated that even though Congress has permitted the tobacco industry
to flourish, knowing full well the consequences of doing so, "one would hope
that those fiscal considerations were weighed against the costs of illness and
death caused by cigarette smoking, as well as the moral responsibility of pro-
tecting the young and future generations who have not yet begun to smoke."2 2
Clearly, a benefit versus risk analysis was proposed.
The Cipollone case regarding the adequacy of the warnings is squarely at
odds with the recent decision of Roysdon v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., that
held the plaintiff could not contest the adequacy of congressionally mandated
health warnings on cigarette packs."3 The court in Roysdon,214 directed a ver-
,"See supra note 34.
11593 F. Supp. 1146 (D.N.J. 1984).
'A cigarette smoker suffering from lung cancer brought state common-law products liability suit against
cigarette companies. The suit was based on strict liability, negligence, intentional tort and breach of warran-
ty. Id. at 1146.
ImSee supra text accompanying notes 42-46.
m'Cipollone, 593 F. Supp. at 1148.
2101d.
2111d. at 1154.
212 1d. at 1147.
"
3Bean & Wallace, Tobacco Firms Win Two Rulings Over Liability, Wall St. J., December 16, 1985, at 6,
col. 3.
"'Plaintiff was Floyd F. Roysdon who smoked Reynold's cigarettes since childhood. Id. Roysdon tried to
hold the cigarette company liable for vascular disease that forced amputation of a leg. Id.
COMMENTSFall, 1 9851
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dict1 5 in favor of the defendants, R.J. Reynolds, holding that the plaintiff had
not established a prima facie case that the product was unreasonably
dangerous."6
In Galbreth v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.," 7 the first jury decision since
the 1960 cigarette cases, a jury in Santa Barbara, California voted nine to three
not to hold R.J. Reynolds liable for the death of a sixty-nine year-old man
allegedly caused by smoking Reynolds' cigarettes since he was a teenager? 8
The case" 9 was argued by Marvin Belli"' who asserted that cigarettes were
clinically addictive and that R.J. Reynolds was negligent in failing to warn
consumers of the alleged risk."' Apparently, causality was never established"
and the jurors indicated they were unconvinced that smoking was addictive.223
As to the issue of assumption of the risk, John Strauch, Reynolds' lead counsel
stated that the verdict demonstrated that the core issue of these cases remained
the same: "that smoking is an issue of individual responsibility." '224 Two crucial
rulings affected the decision. First, the judge ruled that the Surgeon General's
reports of 1964, warning of the danger of smoking were "hearsay" and not ad-
missible as evidence.225 Second, Belli was not permitted to pursue the role of
advertising.226 The plaintiffs family, commenting that at least the trial showed
the American public what it is to die by inches, 27 promised to appeal.228
"'The verdict was directed without hearing the company's defense. Id.
"'Judge Thomas Hull, in reaching his decision, stated, "[tlhe decision in this case is not what Mr. Roysdon
knew or did not know about the dangers of smoking, the question is what an ordinary consumer would be
expected to know." N.Y. Times, December 14, 1985, at 7, col. 6.
"'Bean, R.J. Reynolds Held not Liable in Man's Death, Wall St. J., December 24, 1985, at 2, col. I.
21 Id.
"'The plaintiff was a Mr. Galbraith, who smoked two to three packs of cigarettes a day for most of his life.
Id. After his death the suit was continued by his family. Id.
'"Attorney Belli also argued one of the 1960 cigarette-cancer cases. For a discussion of that case see supra
text accompanying notes 122-27.
"'Bean, supra note 218, at col. 2.
"'The medical evidence in the case was complicated by the plaintiff's long history of health problems
unrelated to smoking. His death was not directly attributable to diseases linked to smoking. The death cer-
tificate listed the cause of death as arteriosclerotic heart disease and pulmonary fibrosis. Lung cancer and
emphysema were listed as contributing causes. Id. However, Stacy Proft, jury foreman stated, "We want to
stress that we don't like smoking and we feel smoking is harmful, the only reason we didn't go to that verdict
was the evidence wasn't there." Elyria Chronicle-Telegram, December 24, 1985, at A4, col. 3. Thomas
Workman, Reynolds' chief attorney, predicted the cigarette companies would continue to win because
science doesn't know the cause of cancer. Id. at col. 6.
"'The jurors indicated that while smoking may have been a habit for Mr. Galbraith, he made the choice to
continue to smoke despite warnings from his doctor and others. Chambers, Reynolds Wins Suit on Smoker
and His Death, N.Y. Times, December 24, 1985, at 7, col. I.
"'Attorney Strauch's statement suggests that the appropriate forum for resolution of the cigarette cases is
the legislature rather than the courts. Bean, supra note 213, at col. 3.
"'Chambers, supra note 223, at col 1.
"'Id. Commenting on the rulings, Attorney Belli indicated he had never seen such a case more replete with
errors. He expressed no doubt that it would be reversed on appeal. Id.
'"The trial lasted five weeks with a total of twenty-two witnesses, mostly experts called by both sides. Id.
mAttorney Belli also promised to pursue similar cases in the future indicating that by next Christmas, "we'll
have one of these under our belts for the plaintiffs." Elyria Chronicle-Telegram, December 24, 1985, at A4,
col. 4.
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Arguably a person who has voluntarily smoked is more susceptible to an
assumption of the risk defense. However, any policy considerations involving
comparative negligence and a risk versus benefit analysis must necessarily con-
sider nonsmokers who are exposed to the harmful effects of cigarette smoke.229
Additionally, there is evidence that smoking results in susceptibility to disabili-
ty and death from other environmental factors330 One such factor is apparent-
ly asbestos. 3' It is contended that cigarette smoking is responsible for a propor-
tion of the asbestos-related damages"' and that cigarette manufacturers should
be third-party defendants in the asbestos litigation. 33
In GAF Corp. v. American Brands Inc., New Jersey based GAF Corpora-
tion claimed that asbestos workers who smoked were more likely to develop
respiratory disease.3 However, GAF was unsuccessful in naming a number of
tobacco companies as codefendants in the 201 asbestos-liability suits the com-
pany faces. 35 The decision to dismiss the GAF motion was not based on the
merits of the claim but on the fact that it would delay current asbestos litiga-
tion.236 As a result, GAF has filed suit in California Superior Court against five
tobacco companies claiming they should share in the asbestos-related
liability.237
CONCLUSION
The cigarette cases provide fascinating insights, not only into contem-
porary American society, but in evolving and emerging doctrinal theories of
negligence and strict liability. In the early 1960's, plaintiffs attempted to
2
"'Non-smokers are actively pursuing smoking-related litigation. Smith v. Western Electric Co., 643 S.W.2d
10 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982). (Exposure to tobacco smoke in the workplace causing irreparable physical injuries is
a basis for a claim against employer for breach of employer common law duty to provide employee a safe
place to work). Shimp v. New Jersey Bell Tel. Co., 145 N.J. Super. 516, 368 A.2d. 408 (1976). (Employee has
a common law right to a safe working environment and a smoke filled environment was not an occupational
hazard which plaintiff voluntarily assumed in pursing her career as a secretary). Parodi v. Merit Sys. Protec-
tion, 690 F.2d 731 (9th Cir. 1982) (Employee established prima facia case of entitlement to disability retire-
ment benefits due to her inability to continue working in a smoke-filled environment). Vickers v. Veterans
Admin., 549 F. Supp. 85 (W.D. Wash. 1982). (No duty on the part of the Veterans Administration to pro-
vide an environment wholly free of tobacco). See generally, Comment, The Legal Conflict Between Smokers
and Non-Smokers: The Majestic Vice Versus the Right to Clean Air, 45 Mo. L. REV. 444 (1980); Comment,
Nonsmoker's Rights: The Employer's Dilemma, 28 ST. Louis U.L.J. 993 (1984); Non-smoking Cells in
Prison, NAT'L L.J., Oct. 29, 1984, at 39, col. 1.
'Reprinted in OCCUPATIONAL RESPIRATORY DISEASE ASBESTOS ASSOCIATED DISEASES, 577 (1980). (Inci-
dence of certain cancers seem to increase among workers who smoke but not among their non-smoking col-
leagues).
23 Haskins, The Tobacco Industry - A Contributor to Asbestos Disabilities, 34 FED'N INS. COUNS. Q. 271,
280-85 (1983-84).
111id. at 303.
'1d. at 310.
4Bean, supra note 213, at col. 4.
Did.
2MId.
"'The American Lawyer, December, 1985, at 19, col. 3. The five companies are American Tobacco, Philip
Morris, American Brands, Brown & Williamson, R.J. Reynolds and Liggett Group.
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pigeon hole without success the cigarette cancer cases into one of the existing
theories of recovery. Both the theories and society have changed. With the
emergence of comparative negligence, products liability and an anti-smoking
mood in America, the ultimate resolution is difficult to predict.
Although the first round of this new wave of product liability suits has
clearly been won by the cigarette companies, the issues are far from being
resolved, particularly in a suit where causality is not in dispute. There is little
doubt that cigarettes cause cancer and cardiac-related diseases. There is equal-
ly, little doubt that the cigarette companies earn enormous profits from selling
cigarettes. Sadly though equally as true, people continue to smoke in spite of
the obvious damage. Whether these conflicting considerations can be merged
into a successful theory of recovery remains to be seen. The attempt to do so,
however, may prove lucrative.238
WILLIAM KEPKO
mlf plaintiffs are successful, the United States tobacco industry would be destroyed. STANDARD & POOR'S
CURRENT ANALYSIS, supra note 27, at F.2. Given the worst scenario in which the cigarette companies are
held to both compensatory and punitive damages, the amount could exceed seven billion dollars per year. Id.
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